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This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking & Finance at the International 
Hellenic University. In this paper I examine the determinants of leverage ratio measured in 
book values, in the context of the United States, using a sample of the 50 largest, in terms of 
market capitalization, American non-financial listed companies for the period of 2014-2018. 
This study finds that company size, company risk and expected growth are positively related 
to the debt ratio level. While on the other hand, the study finds that profitability, level of 
intangible assets and income tax rate are negatively related to the debt ratio during the 
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In modern corporate finance, the optimal capital structure choice is vital and at the same 
time controversial issue. The optimal capital structure is essential for firms that want to 
secure the lower cost of capital and hence, maximize their enterprise value and their 
shareholder’s wealth. Capital structure is determined by several factors that can be classified 
in two categories: (a) the external factors (for example inflation rate) and (b) internal factors 
specific to business (for example profitability, expected growth etc.). Since, the external 
factors are general and common for all businesses within a country, this study will examine 
the impact of internal factors on the financing decisions of the 50 largest, in terms of market 
capitalization, firms of the United States.  
Several capital structure theories have been developed over the years, trying to explain the 
variation in leverage ratios across firms and their determinants. Capital structure choices in 
the context of corporate finance have been traditionally analyzed in Modigliani & Miller 
(1958) paper. Then, other theories developed to explain the use of leverage in a company’s 
capital structure. The trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the agency theory are 
the most significant. 
Many researchers studied the determinants of capital structure based on the previously 
mentioned theories. For example, (Titman & Wessels, 1988), (Fama & French, 2002), 
(DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) and many others.  
This paper aims to investigate the relationship between debt ratio and six internal factors 
and thus, enhance the empirical evidence in the controversial issue of capital structure 
determinants.  
1.1 Research Fundamentals 
 
Before continuing to the main parts of this study, it is useful to familiarize the reader with 
the key terms used and the research identity. Section 2 provides the definitions of the main 
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terms of this study. Section 3 contains the motivation of the study and in section 4 the main 
research objectives are described. 
1.2 Key Terms Definitions 
 
At this part of the study, I will provide the definitions of the key terms used in the research 
to avoid any chance of misunderstanding and familiarize the reader with them. 
• Capital Structure: Is the combination of debt and equity used by a company to finance 
its operations and investments. 
• Profitability: Is a measurement of company’s efficiency. It can be defined as the 
business’s ability to produce returns on an investment based on its resources in 
comparison to alternative investments. 
• Company Size: Usually the size of company is based on the number of employees or 
the amount of its total revenue. In this study the size of a company is defined by the 
amount of its balance sheet total assets. 
• Intangible Assets: Are assets that are not physical in nature (e.g., brand recognition, 
intellectual property, goodwill). 
• Statistically Significance: Is the likelihood that a relationship between variables is 
caused non-asymptomatically.  
1.3 Motivation 
 
Corporate finance theory suggests that there are three major decisions every finance 
manager must take.  
• Investment Decision 
• Financing Decision 
• Dividend Decision 
Corporations aim to make profits to return to their shareholders. Those profits arise from 
successful investments. However, investments need financing. As a result, corporations 
always seek the optimal capital structure which will allow them to maximize their value and 
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at the same time minimize their cost of capital. As previously mentioned, capital structure is 
the combination of debt and equity used by a company to finance its operations and 
investments. As a result, corporations need not only to invest in profitable projects but also 
to use their financing sources wisely in order to be successful and maximize their profitability 
which is their ultimate goal. So, the study of the factors that determine and affect the capital 
structure choice of a company is an extremely important topic in corporate finance.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
This paper attempts to investigate the determinants of capital structure of the largest 50 US 
companies, in terms of market capitalization. The objective of this study is to identify the 
relationship between the capital structure determinants and the leverage level of the firm. 
The list of capital structure determinants has been obtained by the previous literature. The 
determinants that are going to be examined are the following: 
1. Profitability: Earnings before interest and tax as percentage of total assets. 
2. Firm size: Natural logarithm of total assets. 
3. Intangible assets: The ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
4. Firm Risk: Standard deviation on return on equity. 
5. Growth: Average percentage growth of sales. 
6. Tax rate: Corporate tax %. 
Therefore, this study aims to examine the effect that each one of the above determinants 
has on corporate capital structure. 
The rest of the current study is designed as following. Chapter two is devoted to the 
theoretical discussion, literature review and past empirical evidence on the capital structure 
determinants. In the third chapter, data collection, research methodology as well as the 
research hypotheses are described. The empirical results of the study are provided in the 






2.1 Literature Review and Empirical Analysis 
 
Over the years, numerous studies have been conducted on the capital structure theory and 
the determinants of capital structure. The study of capital structure: “it aims to explain the 
mix of securities and financing sources used by corporations to finance real investments” 
stated (Myers, 2001). He also quotes that “there is no universal theory of the debt-equity 
choice, and no reason to expect one”. However, at the same time there are several 
conditional theories that have been proved useful. 
   The capital structure theory is firmly founded upon the pioneering work of (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958). In their paper, they posit that with given perfect markets conditions with no 
taxes, bankruptcy, nor transaction costs, the capital structure of a firm has no impact upon 
its value. In other words, the selection of debt and equity mix cannot influence the value of 
the firm. Of course, such a market is only an ideal environment and cannot exist. On the 
contrary, the financial market environment is characterized by corporate taxes, transaction 
costs and the risk of bankruptcy. Consequently, Modigliani and Miller contacted another 
paper in which they introduced corporate taxes, relaxing their proposition of perfect capital 
markets (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Since debt is tax-deductible, a firm that utilizes debt will 
enjoy an interest tax-shield. As a result, they showed that firm value and the degree of 
leverage are positively correlated. However, it does not mean that corporations should 
always seek to use the maximum possible amount of debt in their capital structures. Since 
other forms of financing, such as retained earnings, may in some cases be cheaper. Some 
years later Miller took into account the impact of both personal taxes and corporate taxes 
and argued that despite tax deductibility, the value of a firm, in equilibrium will still be 
independent of its capital structure (Miller, 1977). To be more specific, Miller (1977) showed 
that under certain conditions, the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is offset 
by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level of the shareholders (Miller, 1977). 
   The Miller (1977) model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several studies. 
Trzcinka, (1982) reports that he cannot reject the Miller (1977) hypothesis that the marginal 
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bondholder’s tax rate is not different than the corporate tax rate, however, he argues that 
this finding does not mean that there is no tax advantage in the corporate debt when the 
personal tax rate on equity is positive. Buser & Hess (1983) used longer time series of data 
and more sophisticated econometric techniques and concluded that leverage-related costs 
and the tax rate on equity have impacts on the relation between taxable and tax-exempt 
yields. 
   Continuing with more empirical studies on capital structure, Bradley, et al., (1984) took a 
more direct approach by using cross-sectional, firm specific data to test the existence of an 
optimal capital structure. They found that firm leverage is related inversely to earnings 
volatility as well as that optimal firm leverage is related inversely to expected costs of 
financial distress and to the amount of non-debt tax shield. Showing empirical evidence on 
the trade-off theory.  
   “The trade-off theory justifies moderate debt ratios. It says that the firm will borrow up to 
the point where the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just offset by the 
increase in the present value of possible costs of financial distress” (Myers, 2001). In other 
words, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between firm leverage ratios and 
the effective tax rate. The theory predicts that in order to take advantage of higher interest 
tax shields, firms will issue more debt when tax rates are higher (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) developed a model in which optimal leverage depends on a firm’s 
nondebt tax shields such as depreciation. Also reported that for firms with highly taxable 
income and secure tangible assets, taxation is beneficial. However, for firms with lower level 
of performance and high level of intangible assets, financing through equity is preferred. 
Thus, they conclude that the leverage is inversely related to the level of nondebt tax shields. 
 MacKie-Mason (1990) argue that the probability of a firm to issue debt to raise new funds 
decreases as the expected value of interest deductibility declines. They also concluded “The 
higher are a firm's non-debt tax shields (e.g. loss carryforwards), the less likely it is to issue 
debt at the margin, because expected tax shield "crowding out" towers the value of interest 
deductibility.” Supporting the positive relationship between tax rates and leverage.  
   If the trade-off theory is right, then value-maximizing companies should never pass up 
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interest tax shields in cases where the probability of financial distress is low. However, there 
are many profitable companies with excellent credit ratings which operate for years at low 
debt ratios. Furthermore, studies of the determinants of actual debt ratios find that the most 
profitable companies in a given industry seem to borrow the least (Myers, 2001). In this 
paper he also quotes his words from (Myers, 1984) that there is “no study clearly 
demonstrating that a firm’s tax status has a predictable, material effect on its debt policy. I 
think that the wait for such a study will be protracted”. No study gives conclusive support for 
the trade-off theory is the conclusion of (Myers, 2001). 
   Another theory related to a company’s capital structure is the Pecking Order theory or the 
Pecking Order Model. It is based on the information asymmetries between a company’s 
management and the outside investors. Myers & Majluf (1984) argued that a firm is said to 
follow a pecking order if it prefers internal financing instead of external. However, if external 
funds are required for capital investment, firms will issue the safest security first, which is 
debt before equity. Myers (2001) concludes that the pecking order theory explains why most 
of the external financing comes from debt. He also states that the pecking order theory 
clarifies why more profitable companies borrow less. Those companies have more internal 
financing options available since they are profitable. Consequently, less profitable firms 
require external sources of financing their operations and investments and as a result they 
accumulate debt. 
   A few studies have been contacted in order to investigate the pecking order theory. Frank 
& Goyal (2003) tested the pecking order theory on a broad cross-section of publicly traded 
American firms over the period of 1971-1998. They found that, on average, internal financing 
could not cover the need for investment spending. As a result, external financing is used. 
Surprisingly, they found that debt financing does not dominate equity financing in magnitude 
and as a result the theory is not supported by the evidence. Fama & French (2002) 
investigated the pecking order and the trade-off theories. They confirmed predictions of 
both models that more profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher 
dividend payouts. Moreover, they confirmed the pecking order model contradicting at the 
same time the trade-off model by finding that more profitable firms are less levered. 
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Furthermore, as the pecking order predicts, short-term variation in investment and earnings 
is mostly absorbed by debt. They concluded that in this study of theirs, they identified a scar 
on the trade-off model which is the negative relation between leverage and profitability and 
one deep wound on the pecking order model which is the large equity issues of small low-
leverage growth firms. The pecking order theory explains how information differences can 
affect a firm’s financing, however, like all theories in capital structure it works better in some 
conditions than in others (Myers, 2001). 
   The agency theory suggests that the combination of debt and equity is an important topic 
in corporate governance. Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued for the inevitability of agency 
costs in corporate finance. Agency costs is a problem which arises from the conflict of 
interests created between the management and the shareholders. So far, it has been 
assumed that the interests of a firm’s financial managers and its shareholders are aligned 
and that managers decide in the shareholders’ best interest. However, perfect alignment is 
impossible in practice. Corporate managers, the agents, will act in their own personal 
interests, seeking the highest possible salaries, job security and in very extreme cases direct 
capture of assets or cash flows. On the other hand, investors can exploit the use of various 
mechanisms of monitoring and control to discourage such value transfers. Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) conclude that the level of the agency costs depends among other things on statutory 
and common law as well as in human ingenuity in devising contracts. They also argue that 
firms can obtain an optimal capital structure by trading off the agency cost of debt against 
the benefit of debt. Kim & Sorensen (1986) in their attempt to empirically test for the 
presence of agency costs and the relation to the debt policy of corporations, found that firms 
with higher inside ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower inside 
ownership. Those results may be explained by the agency costs of debt and/or the agency 
costs of equity. 
   Another important aspect of real corporate financial policy is the equity market timing. 
Equity Market Timing theory suggests that firms will be more likely to issue equity when the 
market values of their shares are high and to repurchase equity when the share prices are 
low (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). In their paper, Baker & Wurgler (2002) also try to answer the 
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basic question of this theory which is whether market timing has a short-run or a long-run 
impact. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that market timing has large and 
persistent effects on the capital structure of a firm. They find that low leverage firms are the 
ones that raise funds when their market valuations, as measured by the market-to-book 
ratio, are high. On the other hand, high leverage firms raise funds when their market 
valuations are low. Baker & Wurgler (2002) concluded that fluctuation in the market value 
have very long-run impacts on capital structure and a simple explanation would be that 
capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to time the equity market. Contrary 
to Baker & Wurgler (2002), Havokimian (2006) found that the importance of historical 
average market-to-book ratios in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market 
timing. Havokimian (2006) concludes that while his results are consistent with market timing 
of equity issues and equity repurchases, he found that the effects of equity transaction 
timing is unlikely to be responsible for significant long lasting effects of market-to-book ratios 
on leverage. Alti (2006) also examined the capital structure implications of market timing. He 
reported the short-term effect of market timing decisions on capital structure for initial 
public offerings. Hot-market IPO firms issue more equity and lower their leverage ratio than 
cold-market firms. The effect of market timing on IPO’s disappeared after two years. 
   A lot of studies have been conducted on capital structure and scholars sought to establish 
the level determinants of capital structure in many of those studies. Titman & Wessels (1988) 
used a sample of manufacturing firms in the US for the period of 1974 to 1982. Their results 
suggest that firms with unique or specialized products have relative debt ratios. The 
uniqueness of a product was measured via the firm’s expenditures on Research and 
Development, selling expenses and the rate which employees leave their jobs. 
Chang, et al. (2008) found a strong result for a 16-year sample during 1988-2003. Their 
findings indicate that the most influential determinant on the capital structure is the growth 
of a company. They measured growth as either the market-to-assets ratio or the market-to-
book equity ratio. Furthermore, the second most influential determinant on the capital 
structure is the profitability when is measured as operating income divided either by total 
assets or by total sales. However, Chang, et al. (2008) inform us that different measures of 
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profitability or growth result in different signs. For instance, the growth has a negative effect 
on leverage its being measured with the market-to-book assets ratio, while it has a positive 
effect if it is measured with market-to-equity ratio. The same applies to profitability too. 
When it is measured as operating income divided by total assets, it has negative effect on 
leverage, on the contrary, when it is measured as operating income divided by total sales, it 
has a positive effect on leverage. Frank & Goyal (2009) in a study of the US capital markets 
from 1950 to 2003 tried to find the most reliable factors for explaining market leverage. Their 
findings are that firms in industries in which the median firm high leverage tend to have high 
leverage. The same applies to firms that have more tangible assets, firms that are large in 
terms of assets and when inflation is expected to be high. On the other hand, firms with high 
profits and firms with high market-to-book ratio tend to have lower leverage. 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Hypothesis 
 
The central focus of this paper is the investigation of the firm specific factors that determine 
the capital structure of a company. As it was discussed in the second chapter of this study, 
the empirical evidence points towards the use of two basic theories: The pecking-order 
theory and the trade-off theory. A significant proportion of the previous literature focuses 
on large public firms i.e. (Titman & Wessels, 1988), (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). This study also 
focuses on the 50 largest listed firms in the US market, in terms of market capitalization for 
the years 2014-2018 and the central research question of this study is: 
“Is the capital structure of a firm affected by the firm specific factors of profitability, company 
size, level of intangible assets, company risk, expected growth and income tax rate, and in 
what way?”. 




3.2 Definition and Selection of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
The term capital structure refers to the mix of different types of securities like long-term 
debts, common stock etc. issued by a firm in order to finance its assets. Companies that have 
no debt are said to be unlevered while firms with debt in their capital structure are said to 
be levered. The dependent variable of this study’s examined model is financial leverage. 
Hundreds of articles have been written regarding capital structure and its determinants and 
therefore different measures of capital structure exist. (Titman & Wessels, 1988) discuss six 
measures of financial leverage in their study of capital structure choice. Roughly, there are 
two major categories of leverage measures : the ones that are based on market value of 
equity and the ones that are based on book value of equity (Lööf, 2003). However, it is quite 
common that due to data limitations, empirical studies use leverage measures in terms of 
book values instead of market values of equity. Is this problem of lacking market data a 
serious problem though? (Myers & Brealey, 2003) suggest that misspecification due to using 
book value measures instead of market value may be insignificant. In this study I will use the 
book value measured financial leverage. To reflect the effects of past financing decisions, in 
this study, I used the total debt over capital (total debt plus equity) ratio as (Rajan & Zingales, 





3.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Capital structure theories suggest that different firm specific factors may affect a company’s 
financing decision. (Titman & Wessels, 1988) state that according different theories some of 
those factors can be asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth uniqueness, firm size, 
profitability, industry classification. Moreover,  according to (Harris & Raviv, 1991) additional 
factors are investment opportunities, volatility, advertising expenditure, probability of 
bankruptcy and uniqueness of the product. Other authors may provide different sets of 
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potential explanatory variables of capital structure choice. As a result, there is plenty of room 
for including additional determinants as well. 
In this study, the following determinants of capital structure will be used: 
• Profitability 
• Company Size 
• Level of Intangible Assets 
• Company risk 
• Expected Growth 
• Corporate income tax rate (%) 
 
The below section is a short discussion for each of the above determinants, their relationship 
to capital structure theories and the way they are measured in this study. 
3.2.2.1  Profitability 
 
There are conflicting theoretical predictions regarding the effect of profitability on financial 
leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). While (Jensen, 1986) predicts a positive relationship given 
that the market for corporate control is effective, on the other hand, (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
predict a negative relationship based on the pecking order theory. Most empirical studies 
have indicated a negative relationship between profitability and financial leverage (Mazur, 
2007).  
In this study the profitability is measured as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 





3.2.2.2  Company Size 
 
There is no clear relationship between company size and leverage. Larger firms are more 
likely to be diversified and fail less often. Taking that into consideration, size may be an 
inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. Moreover, since larger firms are able to issue 
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debt at a lower cost that smaller firms, it is expected that size is positively related to financial 
leverage. (Titman & Wessels, 1988) also supported the positive relationship between firm 
size and leverage. However, (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) argued that larger firms prefer equity 
over debt financing.  
There are also various measures for company size, like the natural logarithm of sales, the 
number of people employed or the natural logarithm of total assets. In this study, the firm 
size is calculated as the natural logarithm of Total Assets. 
SIZE = ln (Total Assets) 
3.2.2.3  Level of Intangible Assets 
 
According to agency cost theory models, there is a conflict between lenders and 
shareholders ( (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), (Harris & Raviv, 1991)). In sum, the agency cost 
theory suggests that the conflicts between lenders and shareholders could lead shareholders 
not to invest in an optimal way. As a result, lenders require tangible assets as collateral to 
protect themselves. Inversely, high level of intangible asset may affect positively the financial 
leverage. 
To measure the level of Intangible Assets in this study, I have calculated the ratio Intangible 





3.2.2.4  Company Risk 
 
As (Titman & Wessels, 1988) argued, the optimal capital structure of a firm, could be 
obtained at a lower level earnings volatility, since higher volatility in earnings indicates a 
greater probability of bankruptcy. As a result, it is expected that firms with higher volatility 
in earnings have lower leverage. 








𝑥𝑖: The return on equity in year i. 
𝑥: The average of return on equity over the tested period 
3.2.2.5  Expected Growth 
 
There is quite large uncertainty regarding the growth factor both in terms of its effect on the 
financial leverage as well as its way of measure. According to the pecking-order theory, a 
positive relationship between growth and leverage should be expected. The reason is that 
higher growth opportunities imply a higher demand for funds and based on the pecking-
order theory, external financing through debt is preferred over equity financing (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). On the other hand, (Myers, 1977) argues that firms investing in assets that 
may generate high growth opportunities in the future, may face difficulties in borrowing due 
to agency problems. However, this problem is mitigated if the firms issue short-term rather 
than long-term debt as (Myers, 1977) points out and therefore a positive relationship is 
expected between growth and short-term debt. 
A common measure of growth is the market-to-book ratio, which is the ratio of the market 
value of assets over the book value of assets (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Other measures of 
growth the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets, research and development over 
sales, percentage change in total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
The proxy used in this study is the percentage change in total assets. 
 
GROW = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛  − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛−1
 
3.2.2.6  Income Tax Rate (%) 
 
Interest tax shields create motives for firms to increase their financial leverage according to 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Moreover, (Miller, 1977) identified that the corporate tax rate is 
a potential determinant of capital structure. As a result, when income tax is higher, firms will 
opt for debt issuance to take advantage of the higher interest tax shields. 
 
The above-mentioned explanatory variables are summarized in the below table: 
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Table 1:Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description 
PROF Earnings Before Interest and Tax as percentage of Total Assets 
SIZE Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
INTANT The ratio of Intangible Assets to total assets 
RISK Standard deviation of Return on Equity (2014-2018) 
GROW Average percentage growth of Total Assets (2014-2018) 
Tax Corporate income tax rate (%) 
 
3.3 The Selection and Collection of Data 
 
The paper is focused on the determinants of capital structure in a sample of the 50 largest 
companies in the Unites States in terms of market capitalization listed on the S&P 500 for 
the period of 2014-20181. Therefore, a total number of 250 observations were analyzed to 
determine the behavior of the companies regarding their financing decisions. 
Unites States stock market was chosen as the most reliable sample due to the strict criteria 
and standards that every listed company must present in its annual financial statements. 
Moreover, the economy of the United States is the world’s largest by nominal GDP and net 
wealth. Its financial markets, the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Market 
are by far the world’s largest stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization and trading 
volume with more than 5,000 companies listed combined. 
This sample does not include any banking institutions since they subject to different terms 
of distribution of capital structure which is beyond the scope of this research. 
The financial data was derived from the Thomson Eikon Database (compatible with IHU). 
The frequency of the observations is yearly. 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
1 The sample was selected based on the market capitalization as it was formed in September 2019. During 
the 5-year tested period the sample of companies remained constant, meaning that different formations 
in the market capitalization for the years 2014-2018 were not accounted. 
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The below table provides the descriptive statistics for the 5-year period for all variables, 
dependent and independent, of 250 observations. 













Mean 0.45 0.14 25.02 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.22 
Median 0.38 0.12 25.15 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.24 
Maximum 1.87 0.39 27.29 16.24 0.58 1.81 0.61 
Minimum 0.00 -0.02 22.68 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -1.72 
Std. Dev. 0.30 0.08 0.97 1.08 0.13 0.20 0.18 
Skewness 1.69 0.91 -0.13 13.32 1.52 4.46 -6.18 
Kurtosis 7.80 3.51 2.61 195.69 4.80 33.38 60.50 
Jarque-
Bera 359.27 37.38 2.28 394145.60 130.24 10443.17 36025.36 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sum 112.86 34.13 6255.46 43.32 27.12 21.26 54.67 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 22.76 1.52 233.26 291.89 4.00 9.49 8.20 
Observatio
ns 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
 
As it is displayed in the above table, the average debt ratio during the tested period for the 
sample is 45% for book value measured leverage. (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) report a 52% of 
book value measured debt ratio. The average profitability is 14 % while the average of all 
firms’ size is about 25 billion USD. The average intangible assets represent about 17% out 
of total assets while the average business risk is about 11%. Lastly, the average growth is 
about 9% and the income tax rate is at 22%. 
The following table summarizes the mean values for all variables for each of the five tested 
years. 













2014 0.3777 0.1343 24.8718 0.0767 0.1028 0.0867 0.2306 
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2015 0.4252 0.1330 24.9366 0.0744 0.1077 0.0734 0.2651 
2016 0.4699 0.1332 25.0202 0.0886 0.1100 0.0999 0.2300 
2017 0.4824 0.1368 25.1171 0.1801 0.1117 0.1079 0.2090 
2018 0.5021 0.1453 25.1636 0.4467 0.1103 0.0572 0.1585 
Graph of 
Evolution 
       
 
For the tested 5-year period, the average debt ratio has increased for the tested sample. 
About the same pattern follows the level of intangible assets, the size of companies as well 
as the company risk. However, income tax rate and expected growth do not follow the 
same pattern. In fact, income tax rate seems to follow the quite opposite, since it has fallen 
dramatically over the tested period. Regarding profitability, although it has increased 
during these years, it does not seem to follow the debt ratio curve. 
The research sample of companies is included in Table 7: Research Sample which can be 
found in the appendix section. 
3.4 Applied Econometric Model 
 
To identify the relationships between the selected explanatory variables and the debt ratio, 
a correlation analysis will be conducted first. Next, a multiple regression model will be 
applied to panel data, given that the registered observations have a two-dimensional 
character: 50 companies are studied over a period of 5 years. Panel data regression models 
are very popular in economic research and in empirical corporate finance. Some of the 
reasons are the increased availability of panel data, as well as the advantages of panel data 




There are two types of panel data: (1) balanced panel, in which for each company, there is 
one observation, respectively, each moment, and (2) unbalanced panel, in which some 
observations are missing. 
To estimate the regression model on the panel data (in this case balanced panel), I will use 
the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). OLS is generally used for one-dimensional data 
such as time series or cross-sectional data, however, it is also applied to panel data.  
Panel regression comprises of three effects namely Common Effect, Fixed Effect and 
Random Effect. The appropriate effect selection for this panel data has been based on the 
Hausman Test. The model could be inefficient if correlation exists between omitted 
explanatory variables and the explanatory variables. To eliminate this inefficiency, I will use 
the Fixed Effects Model to estimate the regression. The Fixed Effects Model takes into 
consideration the heterogeneity of the firms that are part of the sample. More specifically, 
it tries to control the phenomena which are not included in the selected explanatory 
variables, that could influence the dependent variable of the model, the debt ratio. The 
way it does that is by treating the unobservable effects as fixed effects. 
The Fixed-Effect panel data model that is estimated in this study is the following: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑨𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔 ∗ 𝑻𝑨𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Where: 
i = 1, …, n represents the company 
t = time 
y: Depended variable, debt ratio  
PROF: The explanatory variable of profitability 
SIZE: The explanatory variable of size of the firm 
INTAN: The explanatory variable of intangible assets 
RISK: The explanatory variable of business risk 
24 
 
GROW: The explanatory variable of expected growth 
TAX: The explanatory variable of income tax rate 
ε: error term 
The software that has been used to contact this research is the EViews statistical package. 
Microsoft excel has also been used for the computation of the explanatory variables. 
3.5 Robustness of Estimation 
 
There are two factors that need to be addressed properly due to the dealing with panel 
data. Serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. These two problems violate the Gauss-
Markov assumption  𝑉(𝜀) = 𝜎2, in other words, the variance of the error term is constant. 
It is important to mention that although the existence of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity causes invalidation of standard errors and thus invalid t-statistics and f-
statistics, it does not cause inconsistency or estimation bias (Wooldridge, 2005).  
Usually, serial correlation is more likely in long time-series rather than short time-series. 
As a result, it should probably not be a problem in this panel data which consists of 3 years. 
However, to check for any serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson test is used. This test is 
included in the EViews statistical package regression output. This test is on a scale from 0 
to 4 and its interpretation is that if values of the test are close to 0, then this is an indication 
of positive serial correlation. Values close to 4 indicate negative serial correlation, while 
values close to 2 indicate no serial correlation. The results of the Durbin-Watson test can 
be seen in Table 6: Results of the econometric estimation in section Regression results.  
In case heteroscedasticity is present in a model, then 𝑉(𝜀) = 𝜎2 is violated. In other words, 
different error terms do not have identical variances, as I mentioned previously. 
Consequently, the model is inefficient, the standard errors are wrong, even though the 
estimation of the test is unbiased. The problem of heteroscedasticity often occurs in cross-
sectional data and since the panel data of this study consists of both time-series and cross-
sections, heteroscedasticity should be carefully be examined. In order to identify 
heteroscedasticity, the regression residuals should be plotted on a graph. A large variation 
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in the residuals is a possible sign of heteroscedasticity. However, since all doubt must be 
eliminated, a formal test is needed. The most common tests for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity are the White-test and the Breusch-Pagan test. If heteroscedasticity is 
present, it can be resolved by using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, which 
are often called White standard errors. Unfortunately, EViews cannon calculate these tests 
in the context of panel data and so, no formal test was calculated. However, the model has 
been regressed both with and without the use of white-standard errors. In the first case, 
in which white-standard errors were not used, the estimation was not significant, and, in 
some determinants, it made no sense. For that reason, it was decided to use the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent, white-standard errors for the reported results.  
Lastly, in addition to the considerations of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, a 
correlation matrix has been calculated to check for multicollinearity presence. The 
Pearson-correlation matrix did not lead to any indication of multicollinearity. 
 
4. The Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Correlation Analysis 
 
The table below depicts the Pearson’s correlation between the different variables of the 
model. 














(Book Value) 1.000       
Profitability 0.208 1.000      
Size -0.037 -0.452 1.000     
Intangible 
Assets 0.262 0.258 -0.071 1.000    




Growth -0.096 -0.141 -0.055 -0.050 0.122 1.000  
Income Tax 
Rate 0.070 0.146 0.075 0.038 -0.031 0.056 1.000 
 
Correlation is a first metric to depict the direction between the variables and their strength 
association. To be more specific, regarding the model’s dependent variable, the book value 
measured debt ratio, the findings show that: The debt ratio is positively correlated to the 
variables of profitability, level of intangible assets and business risk and income tax rate. 
On the other hand, it is negatively correlated to firm size and expected growth. 
Moreover, the correlation matrix above suggests that given that the observed correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables are relatively low, so, multicollinearity 
should not be a serious problem in this study. 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
The regression analysis is carried out to investigate the impact of the explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable. The results of the regression analysis are shown in this section. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Fixed Effects Model will be used for estimating 
the regression, in order to eliminate the inefficiency that could arise if correlation exist 
between the unobservable effects (omitted explanatory variables) and the explanatory 
variables. 
4.2.1 The Hausman Test 
 
To decide whether fixed or random effects would be applied to the regression model, the 
Hausman test has been applied. 
Table 5: Hausman test Output 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman 
Test 
   
Test cross-section random effects 
   
    







Cross-section random 25.401151 6 0.0003 
 
The test hypothesis: 
-𝐻0: The preferred model is random effects 
-𝐻1: The preferred model is fixed effects 
As the p-value of the test is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% confidence 
interval and as a result the fixed effects model is the preferred one. 
4.2.2 Regression results 
 
The below table contains the results of the multiple regression model. 
Table 6: Results of the econometric estimation2 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Leverage     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PROF -0.85825*** 0.175507 -4.89012 0 
SIZE 0.150075*** 0.024407 6.148782 0 
INTAN -0.404179*** 0.142437 -2.837597 0.0056 
RISK 0.016712*** 0.00216 7.738111 0 
GROW 0.032416 0.021621 1.499332 0.1371 
TAX -0.016407 0.017996 -0.911684 0.3643 












resid 0.326429 Schwarz criterion -1.421664 






Prob(F-statistic) 0    
 
2 *** Statistically significant at 1%,5%,10% 
     ** Statistically significant at 5%,10% 




According to the above table there is a positive relationship between book value debt ratio 
and the explanatory variables of company size, company risk, and expected growth. On the 
other hand, profitability, level of intangible assets and income tax rate are negatively 
related to the book value debt ratio. The adjusted R squared coefficient of the regression 
is 97.62% which indicates that the independent variables included in the model have a high 
explanatory power. 
4.2.2.1 Statistical Significance of the Regression coefficients 
 
So, according to the coefficient outputs the regression model is: 
Leverage = -3.122 – 0.858*PROF + 0.150*SIZE – 0.404*INTAN + 0.016*RISK + 
0.032*GROW – 0.016*TAX 
𝛽0 = −3.122 (constant), which is statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% confidence 
intervals (Prob. 0.00 < 0.01).  
𝛽1 =  −0.858 (coefficient of profitability), which is statistically significant at 1%,5% and 
10% confidence intervals (Prob. 0.00 < 0.01). 
𝛽2 =  0.150 (coefficient of company size), which is statistically significant at 1%,5% and 
10% confidence intervals (Prob. 0.00 < 0.01). 
𝛽3 =  −0.404 (coefficient of level of intangible assets), which is statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals (Prob. 0.005 < 0.01). 
𝛽4 =  0.016 (coefficient of company risk), which is statistically significant at 1%,5% and 
10% confidence interval (Prob. 0.00 < 0.01). 
𝛽5 =  0.031 (coefficient of expected growth), which is not statistically significant at 10% 
confidence interval (Prob. 0.13 > 0.10). 
𝛽6 =  −0.016 (coefficient of income tax rate), which is not statistically significant at 10% 
confidence interval (Prob. 0.36 > 0.10). 
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Moreover, the F value of the test is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
intervals (Prob. 0 < 0.05).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is not a statistically significant impact of 
profitability, size, intangible assets, risk, growth, and tax on the debt ratio is rejected since 
at least one of the explanatory variables affect the debt ratio. 




The negative sign of profitability points out that firms with high level of profitability will 
mostly depend on internal source funds than proceeding to debt solutions which goes 
along with the pecking order theory which is also consistent with (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
as well as (Veld & De Jong, 2001). Moreover, as (Hovakimian, et al., 2004) argued, firms 
with relatively high profitability are more likely to have more valuable assets and thus, 
achieve higher debt ratios.  
4.2.3.2 Company Size 
 
The results indicate that company size is a significant determinator of financial leverage. It 
is consistent with the empirical findings of (Berger, et al., 1997) as well as the trade-off 
theory and agency theories, meaning that larger firms are more diversified than smaller 
ones, and thus, they are associated with lower risk of bankruptcy and better borrowing 
capacity. As also implied by (Warner, 1977), large firms do not face considerable difficulties 
in raising external loans. Even if in this study I did not decompose short-term debt and 
long- term debt, the results of (Bevan & Danbolt, 2000). They have found that company 
size is positively correlated to the trade credit and equivalent and short-term securitized 
debt but have a negative relationship with the short-term bank borrowing. 




The level of intangible assets has a negative statistically significant relationship with the 
debt ratio. This implies that companies with a higher level of Intangible asset to Fixed assets 
ratio are not highly levered. Those findings are also consistent with the evidence reported 
in the literature, for instance, (Harris & Raviv, 1991). (Bevan & Danbolt, 2000) argued that 
long-term debt forms are used to finance fixed tangible assets while non fixed assets are 
mainly financed through short-term borrowings. In this study the decomposition between 
long- and short-term borrowings has not been made, however it could give some more 
insights regarding the relationship between asset intangibility and debt ratio. 
4.2.3.4 Company Risk 
 
The company risk has a positive relationship with debt ratio in the examined model. 
However, its effect is very small, but still statistically significant. In their paper Kale, et al. 
(1991) found that the relationship between company risk and optimal debt level is roughly 
U-shaped, decreasing for low levels of business risk and increasing for high levels.  
4.2.3.5 Expected Growth 
 
According to the above theoretical discussion regarding growth, the outcome could be 
either a positive relationship between expected growth and leverage, due to the higher 
demand for funds, or a negative relationship due to the higher costs of financial distress. 
The results indicate positive non statistically significant relationship between Expected 
Growth and the debt ratio. This result supports the pecking order theory. Contrary to the 
work of (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) who stated that firms try to finance their investments 
mainly through equity, the results indicate that high growth firms need to borrow more to 
finance their growth projects.  
4.2.3.6 Income Tax Rate 
 
Contrary to what was expected, income tax rate is negatively related to debt ratio during 
the tested period. However, this negative relationship is not statistically significant. This 
31 
 
result indicates that tax advantages of debt were not attractive to American firms during 
the tested period. 




Capital structure theories and capital structure determinants are issues that have attracted 
many finance researchers over the years. Many theories have been proposed, and many 
empirical researches have been contacted to determine the relationship between a 
company’s leverage levels and its determinants.  
The current study attempts to investigate this relationship by examining six determinants 
that may affect the decision of a company to use financial leverage or not, to finance its 
assets, in the context of United States. Those six factors are profitability, firm size, level of 
intangible assets, business risk, expected growth, and income tax rate. A sample of 50 
American non-financial firms over the period of 2014-2018 was used for this empirical 
analysis. To proceed with the analysis, debt ratio was calculated in book value terms  
The findings reveal that company size, company risk and expected growth are positively 
related to the debt ratio. At the same time, profitability, level of intangible assets and 
income tax rate are negatively related to the debt ratio. 
The sign and direction of profitability and expected growth support the pecking order 
theory. On the other hand, the sign and direction of company size support the trade-off 
theory, whereas the sign and direction of company risk does not support neither the trade-
off nor the pecking order theory. Τhis study shows that multiple capital structure theories 
may apply at the same time in a tested sample proving the words of Myers (2001) that 
“there is no universal theory of debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one”. 
To conclude, this study represents a benchmark for future empirical research regarding 
the firm specific factors of financial leverage of the largest companies in the US market. 
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5.2 Limitations of this Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This study investigates the determinants of capital structure of 50 firms from the United 
States that are part of the S&P 500 index for the period of 2014-2018. The factors on capital 
structure that have been examined are just six and they could have been extended to a 
greater amount, including, for example, dividend payout ratio, age of firm being listed in 
the stock market, ownership structure etc. Furthermore, a limitation of this study is the 
fact that analyzes only the relationships between the determinants and the total debt. 
Further research can be contacted estimating the relationship of determinant with short 
term or long-term debt. Moreover, the sample of this study is limited to only 50 U.S. 
companies, however, it could have been conducted in a worldwide scale. Additionally, the 
sample is tested over a period of 5 years. More years could have been used to arrive to 
more robust results. Finally, the research can be extended by using more sophisticated 
econometric models, such as GMM model, which was not used in this study. 
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Table 7: Research Sample 
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Number Company Symbol 
1 AAPL.O Apple Inc 
2 ABT Abbott Laboratories 
3 ACN Accenture PLC 
4 ADBE.O Adobe Inc 
5 AMGN.O Amgen Inc 
6 AMZN.O Amazon.com Inc 
7 BA Boeing Co 
8 BRKb Berkshire Hathaway Inc 
9 CMCSA.O Comcast Corp 
10 COST.O Costco Wholesale Corp 
11 CSCO.O Cisco Systems Inc 
12 CVX Chevron Corp 
13 DHR Danaher Corp 
14 DIS Walt Disney Co 
15 FB.O Facebook Inc 
16 GOOGL.O Alphabet Inc 
17 HD Home Depot Inc 
18 HON Honeywell International Inc 
19 IBM International Business Machines Corp 
20 INTC.O Intel Corp 
21 JNJ Johnson & Johnson 
22 KO Coca-Cola Co 
23 LLY Eli Lilly and Co 
24 LMT Lockheed Martin Corp 
25 MA Mastercard Inc 
26 MCD Mcdonald's Corp 
27 MDT Medtronic PLC 
28 MRK Merck & Co Inc 
29 MSFT.O Microsoft Corp 
30 NEE Nextera Energy Inc 
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31 NFLX.O Netflix Inc 
32 NKE Nike Inc 
33 NOKIA.HE Nokia Oyj 
34 NVDA.O NVIDIA Corp 
35 ORCL.K Oracle Corp 
36 PEP.O PepsiCo Inc 
37 PFE Pfizer Inc 
38 PG Procter & Gamble Co 
39 PM Philip Morris International Inc 
40 SBUX.O Starbucks Corp 
41 T AT&T Inc 
42 TXN.O Texas Instruments Inc 
43 UNH UnitedHealth Group Inc 
44 UNP Union Pacific Corp 
45 UPS United Parcel Service Inc 
46 RTX Raytheon Technologies Corp 
47 V Visa Inc 
48 VZ Verizon Communications Inc 
49 WMT Walmart Inc 
50 XOM Exxon Mobil Corp 
 
 
 
 
 
